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PAGE 01 STATE 246011

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, FR

SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY AND FOR NO, RPT NO ACTION, SECRETARY HAS GIVEN FON MIN DE GUIRINGAUD THE FOLLOWING LETTER (WITH ATTACHMENT WHICH WAS SENT TO YOU SEPTTEL). THESE DOCUMENTS DEAL WITH THE UPCOMING ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF NEW US POLICIES TOWARD NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING US POLICIES TOWARD DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REPROCESSING, BASED UPON THE RESULTS OF THE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT LAST JULY, WHICH RECENTLY PRESENTED TO HIM ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR NUCLEAR POLICY INITIATIVES.

2. THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, HE REQUESTED AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ON A MOST CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, INFORM IN ADVANCE HIS COUNTER-PARTS IN THE KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIER STATES WITH WHOM WE HAV

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 246011

HAD CONTINUING AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION FIELD AND FROM WHOM WE WOULD SEEK SUPPORT FOR OUR INITIATIVES.

3. SIMILAR LETTERS WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS ALSO BEING DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRG, CANADA, UK AND JAPAN. IN EACH CASE WE HAVE STRESSED THAT THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY AND BE LIMITED TO MINIMUM NECESSARY OFFICIALS.

4. LETTER TO FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FOLLOWS:

DEAR LOUIS:

A. AS YOU WILL RECALL, I PROMISED IN EARLY SEPTEMBER THAT I WOULD GIVE YOUR GOVERNMENT ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW WHICH WE HAD UNDERTAKEN OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THESE USEFUL AS YOU PURSUE YOUR OTN INTERNAL STUDIES, AND THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF OUR RESPECTIVE EXERCISES CAN FORM A STRONG

BASIS FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

B. THESE RESULTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE ENCLOSED INFORMAL PAPER WHICH SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY ASSESSMENT. IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONTINUED DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR NUCLEAR EXPORT AND NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES, THE PRESIDENT WISHES SHORTLY TO COMMUNICATE THESE POLICY APPROACHES TO THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

WE THEREFORE WISH TO ADVISE AND CONSULT OUR MAJOR NUCLEAR PARTNERS IN ADVANCE AND TO ENCOURAGE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL CONSENSUS IN OUR NUCLEAR EXPORT DELIBERATIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

C. BEYOND THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY CONCERNS GUIDING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS, THREE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 03 STATE 246011

UNDERLIE OUR INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONCLUSIONS. THE FIRST IS THAT STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ON PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AND NUCLEAR PARTNERS, IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THESE EFFORTS. THE SECOND IS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BALANCE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS WITH POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS, PARTICULARLY ASSURED SUPPLY OF NON-SENSITIVE FUEL AND EQUIPMENT. THE THIRD CONSIDERATION IS THAT SUCH INDUCEMENTS SHOULD PLACE NO NUCLEAR SUPPLIER AT COMMERCIAL DISADVANTAGE.

D. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, WE HAVE CAREFULLY

REVIEWED BOTH TRADITIONAL AND MORE RECENT NON-PROLIFERATION APPROACHES, MANY OF WHICH ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE LONDON SUPPLIERS' MEETINGS AND AT THE IAEA. ON THE ONE HAND, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO MEET FULLY THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND UNIFORM APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS AND FOR PROMPT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THEIR VIOLATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO ESTABLISHING VIABLE, LONG-TERM ALTERNATIVES TO THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT PLANTS WHICH CAN LEAD DIRECTLY TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE INTENDS TO REITERATE STRONG US SUPPORT FOR THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, TO SPECIFY HOW THE UNITED STATES MIGHT AMPLIFY ITS SUPPORT, AND TO UNDERSCORE THE GRAVITY WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD VIEW ANY FURTHER PROLIFERATION OR THE VIOLATION OF ANY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN THE ENCLOSED PAPER. WE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME PARALLEL STATEMENTS ALONG SIMILAR LINES FROM IAEA MEMBERS AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD JOINTLY EXPLORE WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS, RELIABILITY AND INVIOABILITY OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH ITS STATUTE.

F. THE PRESIDENT ALSO INTENDS TO RENEW THE US PROPOSAL TO ALL RELEVANT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS THAT THERE BE NO MORE EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AND THAT WE EXPLORE TOGETHER LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS TO OFFER MORE ECONOMICAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING SERVICES INSTEAD OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO MEETING NUCLEAR CONSUMERS' LEGITIMATE ENERGY NEEDS. IN ADDITION, MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS INTERNATIONAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 246011

RATHER THAN NATIONAL STORAGE OF SPENT REACTOR FUEL AND SEPARATED PLUTONIUM WHICH ARE IN EXCESS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR NEEDS, AND WOULD HOPE TO ACTIVELY PURSUE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS INTERNATIONAL REGIME WITH NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONSUMERS. IN ADDITION, IN SELECTED INSTANCES WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PURCHASE OR EXCHANGE OF FRESH FOR SPENT REACTOR FUEL WHEN THIS APPROACH ENTAILS NON-PROLIFERATION BENEFITS, PARTICULARLY IN DETERRING THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING CAPABILITIES.

G. IN MAKING THESE PROPOSALS, I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES VARY AMONG SUPPLIERS IN THE CRITICAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING SECTORS. IN THE UNITED STATES, WE SEEK TO EXPAND URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPACITY THROUGH THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND A GOVERNMENT ADD-ON FACILITY. THE PRESIDENT ALSO INTENDS TO MOVE FORWARD IN SUPPORTING EXPERIMENTATION TO ASSESS THE FEASIBILITY AND SAFETY OF REPROCESSING BASED ON A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

AS WELL AS TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES TO REPROCESSING. HE WILL EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE NO PRECONCEPTIONS AS TO THE NECESSITY, COMMERCIAL UTILITY, AND VIABILITY OF RE-PROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM RECYCLE, AND THAT WE WILL ASSIGN FIRST PRIORITY TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY FACTORS IN MAKING FUTURE JUDGMENTS. AS IN OUR CONCEPT FOR NEW ENRICHMENT FACILITIES, THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM WOULD ALLOW FOR APPROPRIATE PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NATIONS AND EXPLORATION OF FUEL SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS. THIS CONFORMS TO OUR PAST PROPOSALS THAT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS OFFER SUCH SERVICES TO HELP DISCOURAGE THE FURTHER SPREAD REPROCESSING FACILITIES.

H. IN PURSUING SERVICES AND POSSIBLE NUCLEAR FUEL EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS INSTEAD OF TECHNOLOGY, HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THESE NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN COMMERCIAL TENSIONS. WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WAYS OF COORDINATING AND PERHAPS POOLING OUR RESOURCES TO ENSURE CONSUMERS UNINTERRUPTED AND ECONOMICAL SUPPLY OF NON-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FUEL, SUPPLIERS UNDIMINISHED COMMERCIAL RETURN FOR THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORT COMMITMENTS, AND ALL COUNTRIES SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 246011

ASSURANCE AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES.

I. IN THIS REGARD, WE MAY WISH TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF FUEL EXCHANGES, WHICH COULD NOT ONLY HELP COORDINATE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND EXCHANGE BUT FACILITATE BROAD ADHERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SPENT FUEL AND PLUTONIUM STORAGE REGIME WHICH WE ARE JOINTLY SEEKING TO ESTABLISH. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE A LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVE, BUT THE CONCEPT MAY WARRANT JOINT STUDY.

J. FINALLY, IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PLUTONIUM CONTROL, WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE SUBSTANTIAL STEPS AND TO CONSULT ON FURTHER WAYS TO SUPPORT/CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL STORAGE REGIME UNDER IAEA AUSPICES. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, THE US IS PREPARED TO PLACE ITS OWN EXCESS CIVIL SPENT FUEL AND SEPARATED PLUTONIUM IN IAA DEPOSITORIES, PENDING US NEED, IF A GENERALLY ANCEPTABLE REGIME CAN BE DEVELOPED AND ESTABLISHED. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO GIVE ACTIVE SUPPORT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH AN IAEA REGIME AND PLAN TO REFLECT THIS SUPPORT IN OUR NEW AND AMENDED AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION. OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT VERY MUCH HOPES THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS OTHERS, WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS OF ITS OWN TO FOSTER THIS IMPORTANT APPROACH. WE SINCERELY BELIEVE

THAT THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IAEA STORAGE REGIME, AS CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE XII OF THE STATUTE, WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REINFORCE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ASSURANCES THAT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER CAN DEVELOP IN A SAFE AND PRUDENT MANNER.

K. I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR RUSH TO BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE ANY REACTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE TO THE PROPOSALS IN THIS LETTER AND IN THE ENCLOSED PAPER I ALSO PLAN TO DIRECT OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE IAEA AND THE LONDON MEETING OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO PURSUE THESE AND OTHER PROMISING APPROACHES WHICH CAN MEET THE CRITICAL NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AHEAD OF USBM

CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 06 STATE 246011

L. AT THE SAME TIME AS WE RECOGNIZE THE SPECIAL NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON THESE ISSUES, YOU KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT AND I ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO COORDINATION OF OUR FUTURE ACTIONS WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AND I REMAIN ALWAYS READY TO RESPOND PERSONALLY TO ANY SPECIAL POINTS WHICH YOU WISH TO BRING TO MY ATTENTION.

WITH WARM REGARDS

SINCERELY

HENRY A. KISSINGER

HIS EXCELLENCY
LOUIS DE GUIRINGAUD
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
PARIS

KISSINGER

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